On the Legal Compatibility of Fairness Definitions by Xiang, Alice & Raji, Inioluwa Deborah
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
00
76
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  2
5 N
ov
 20
19
On the Legal Compatibility of Fairness Definitions
Alice Xiang
Partnership on AI
San Francisco, CA 94109
alice@partnershiponai.org
Inioluwa Deborah Raji
Partnership on AI
San Francisco, CA 94109
deb@partnershiponai.org
Abstract
Past literature has been effective in demonstrating ideological gaps in machine
learning (ML) fairness definitions when considering their use in complex socio-
technical systems. However, we go further to demonstrate that these definitions
often misunderstand the legal concepts fromwhich they purport to be inspired, and
consequently inappropriately co-opt legal language. In this paper, we demonstrate
examples of this misalignment and discuss the differences in ML terminology and
their legal counterparts, as well as what both the legal and ML fairness communi-
ties can learn from these tensions. We focus this paper on U.S. anti-discrimination
law since the ML fairness research community regularly references terms from
this body of law.
1 Why Legal Compatibility is Important
ML fairness literature is often presented as a step toward reducing algorithmic bias in high-stakes
human systems—from the COMPAS risk assessment tool as part of the broader judicial system
[27] to hypothetical loan mis-allocation scenarios affecting human livelihoods [22]. Others have
identified a gap between ML measurements and the complex reality of the socio-technical human
environments in which they are deployed [35; 19]. One key aspect of this gap is the divergence
between legal and ML fairness concepts. Although the ML fairness community often uses legal
terminology to motivate their research, these terms are used without a deeper understanding of their
meanings.
To build frameworks of accountability and governance,ML fairness definitions must align with their
corresponding legal definitions. This alignment must happen from both sides, as key lessons from
the ML fairness literature should also inform how the law evolves to accommodate algorithmic bias.
There are two primary legal scenarios to consider. First, to demonstrate evidence of algorithmic
unfairness, ML definitions must accurately map onto their legal counterparts to establish liability.
For algorithm developers to be incentivized to adopt particular bias measures, these metrics must
conform to what judges, juries, or agencies would accept as evidence of discrimination or lack
thereof. Second, to deploy bias correction methods in the real world, it is important that the methods
themselves are not determined to be discriminatory from a legal perspective. Thus, in order for the
research of the ML fairness community to have an impact on deployed systems, we must assess the
legal compatibility of this work.
In this short paper, we present various examples of the current tension that exists between ML
fairness and legal definitions. We go further to provide cases of legal precedent to illustrate the
issues that arise from the lack of compatibility of these definitions. We focus on lessons from
U.S. anti-discrimination law since the ML fairness research community regularly references terms
from this body of law. In addition, we explore lessons that the legal community can learn from
the ML fairness community. We hope this work encourages those from the legal and ML fairness
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communities to collaborate on research and initiatives that have real-world impact on the fairness of
ML tools making consequential decisions within complex human systems.
2 Lessons from Anti-Discrimination Law for ML Fairness
In this section, we discuss terms from anti-discrimination law that are often co-opted or misinter-
preted in the ML fairness literature.
2.1 Discrimination
In ML literature, “discrimination” is often presented as an unjust correlation between protected class
variables and some metric of interest, such as outcomes, false positive rates, or a similarity metric
[22; 27]. Perceived as an illogical phenomenon in the system, many projects aim to “optimally adjust
any learned predictor so as to remove discrimination” [22]. However, this view is over-simplified
when considering how discrimination is defined legally. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Fair Housing
Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Americans with Disabilities Act, among other
statutes, provide anti-discrimination protections in housing, employment, and other domains. These
acts primarily define discrimination though motive, evidenced intent of exclusion, and causality,
rather than simply outcomes. Moreover, they are highly domain-specific. Gauging this discrimina-
tory intent is complicated, often involves specific contextual compliance checklists and references
[25], and cannot be easily “removed.”
2.2 Protected Class/Sensitive Attribute
In ML, protected attributes are presented as recorded or visible traits that should not factor into
a decision, such as age, race, or gender. Legally, less commonly measured attributes can also be
considered, such as sexual orientation, pregnancy, and disability status. Moreover, although the ML
community often refers to members of protected classes as those in “minority and marginalized
groups” [24], current anti-discrimination laws operate symmetrically on the attributes of race and
gender [10]. In fact, many landmark anti-discrimination law cases feature white male plaintiffs
arguing that anti-discrimination law protects them against policies that seek to benefit minorities
[33; 4; 5]. As the ML community develops technical definitions for fairness, it is important for
researchers to contemplate whether they would want their definitions to be used by those in the
majority against those in the minority.
2.3 Anti-classification and Anti-subordination
There are two major motivations for anti-discrimination law—anti-classification and anti-
subordination [11]. Anti-classification is the idea that classifications based on protected class
attributes are impermissible. The ML fairness community is actually quite familiar with this
concept—“fairness through unawareness” [17] is an instantiation of this principle, and there has
been work explicitly presenting anti-classification as a potential fairness objective [15]. However,
anti-subordination is rarely called out as a motivation in ML fairness literature. Anti-subordination is
the idea that anti-discrimination laws should serve to actively dismantle societal hierarchies between
different groups, empowering historically disenfranchised and vulnerable groups, even if doing so
requires unequal treatment of a particular group. Although debiasing techniques developed by the
ML community might have the effect of anti-subordination [32], this balancing of the scales of his-
torical injustice and hierarchies is rarely explicitly acknowledged or understood as a justified goal.
2.4 Affirmative Action
The ML fairness community has articulated a goal of “‘fair affirmative action,’ which guarantees
statistical parity (i.e., the demographics of the set of individuals receiving any classification are the
same as the demographics of the underlying population), while treating similar individuals as sim-
ilarly as possible” [17] and understands affirmative action to be cases in which we “explicitly take
demographics into account” [28]. However, the legal precedent around affirmative action demon-
strates this interpretation to be inaccurate, particularly when applied to the algorithmic context.
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Landmark affirmative action cases have concluded that schools seeking to increase racial diversity
cannot use racial quotas [4] or point systems [3]. The Supreme Court, however, has permitted the
use of race as one of many holistic factors while evaluating candidates as individuals [3; 1]. In
higher education, schools have dealt with this conundrum through greater opacity, seeking to be
race conscious without making explicit how race factors into admissions decisions [33]. Thus, an
unsophisticated direct application of these precedents to the algorithmic context would suggest that
developers who want to address bias in their algorithms should be opaque in their use of protected
class variables or avoid use altogether, practices that the ML community explicitly denounces as
“naive” [22].
2.5 Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
In ML literature, disparate treatment is often explained as making use of the protected attribute in
the decision-making process [26], while disparate impact is understood as when “outcomes differ
across subgroups (even unintentionally)” [32]. In this work, disparate treatment is presented as a
justification for avoiding the use of protected class variables in debiasing techniques [17; 32], while
disparate impact is used to justify group fairness formulations [18; 15; 12].
However, these conceptswere developedwith human discriminators in mind, so simply replacing the
human decision-maker with an algorithmic one is often not appropriate. For instance, the key legal
question for disparate treatment is whether the alleged discriminator’s actions were motivated by
discriminatory intent [2]. Intent is an inherently human characteristic—an algorithm cannot possess
intent by itself, so the characterization of disparate treatment as the use of protected class variables
in an algorithm is highly contestable. In fact, it is unclear if the concept of disparate treatment is
relevant to evaluating the non-human components of a system at all.
Although disparate impact seems more focused on outcomes, these disproportionate outcomes are
still seen by some as “smoke” or evidence of the fire of discriminatory intent [6; 33]. Showing
disproportionate outcomes is only the first step of a disparate impact case; there is only liability
if the defendant cannot explain or justify these disproportionate outcomes with nondiscriminatory
rationales or the plaintiff cannot establish a less discriminatory alternative that similarly achieves
legitimate business goals [34].
Disparate treatment and disparate impact are sometimes in tension when organizations seek to pre-
vent disproportionate outcomes by being race conscious. Ricci v. DeStefano [5] is a key employment
discrimination case illustrating this tension. In that case, the city of New Haven voided the results
of a promotion process for firefighters after realizing that the process would have only promoted
white and Hispanic firefighters and no black firefighters. The Court concluded that this constituted
disparate treatment since the city did not have a “strong basis in evidence" that it would have been
subjected to disparate impact liability if it had followed through with the promotions. This case has
led some scholars in the ML fairness community [30] to conclude that correcting bias in algorithms
ex post might be prohibited by law. Others in the legal community, however, [29; 33] have inter-
preted Ricci more narrowly, concluding that it would not limit most efforts to correct for bias since
the Court in this case was heavily motivated by the fact that many firefighters spent significant time
and money preparing for the test, an issue that would not apply in most algorithmic contexts.
3 Broader Legal Lessons for ML Fairness
Outside the specific doctrines of anti-discrimination law, there are some general legal fairness prin-
ciples that can be useful to consider for algorithmic fairness.
3.1 Intersectionality
Intersectionality was motivated by critical race theory to humanize subjects and highlight their in-
dividual considerations in legal decision-making. For example, legal scholars discuss how black
women often struggled to succeed in anti-discrimination cases if they could not establish that their
experiences were reflective of discrimination against black individuals generally or female individu-
als generally, rather than the black women specifically [16]. Similarly, ML fairness literature tends
to categorize and stereotype individuals in a way that masks more specific individual-level harms,
at best only considering additive combinations of unitary classes (i.e., you are white and a man)
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[13; 23]. Even attempts at more granular algorithmic “individual fairness” relies on a similarity met-
ric and minimizing the influence of protected variables [17], rather than acknowledging and seeking
to account for the combination of oppressive challenges faced by the individual.
3.2 Procedural Justice
In ML, the term “procedural fairness” has been co-opted to refer to identifying the input features
that lead to a particular model outcome, as a proxy for the “process” through which the model makes
its prediction [21]. This is a narrow and misguided view of what this legal term means. Rather than
attempting to specify definitions of fair outcomes, procedural justice seeks to arrive at just outcomes
through iterative processes and the close examination of the set of governance structures in place
to guide individual human decision-making [14]. The goal should thus be to analyze the system
surrounding the algorithm and its use, including posing key questions on contestability and due
diligence, rather than scoping down into the specifics of the algorithm itself.
4 Lessons from ML Fairness for Law
Finally, we address a few examples of how the legal and policy communities could learn from the
ML fairness research community.
4.1 Measurement of Bias
What makes algorithms unique is that in theory it is easier to empirically measure discrimination
in these defined systems than their very messy human counterparts. That said, moving away from
“fairness through unawareness” and making a case for the use of protected variables to effectively
measure discrimination, although an intuitive and proven conclusion from a mathematical perspec-
tive, is still much more difficult to make a case for in a legal sense. Making the technical case for
why it is important to relax restrictions on the collection and use of demographic data, and have this
data accessible for external audits would inform the legal discourse on this topic.
4.2 Narrow Domain of Application
The Constitution primarily protects against discrimination by government actors, so if Congress or
state legislatures do not pass anti-discrimination laws against private actors in a specific domain, indi-
viduals have little legal recourse. Although ML research often discusses the fairness of ad targeting
and recommendation algorithms, bias in these algorithms—although potentially immoral—is not
generally illegal. For example, the ProPublica article on Facebook’s advertising targeting platform,
which allowed advertisers to exclude users based on their “ethic affinity” [9], resulted in private
class-action lawsuits and charges from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
However, these legal actions only applied to advertisements concerning housing, employment, and
credit/lending, leading Facebook to make changes restricting demographic targeting for ads in these
domains, but not in others [20]. ML fairness researchers often focus more broadly, reaching beyond
the domains of current anti-discrimination law. As the use of ML algorithms proliferates, this in turn
can open up the conversation for what new anti-discrimination protections to consider.
4.3 Causality
Most anti-discrimination laws are motivated by causality, i.e. decisions cannot be made “because
of” an individual’s protected class. However, judges and policymakers are often not aware of what
would indicate causality in the context of algorithms. For example, the HUD recently proposed a
rule that would create a safe harbor from disparate impact claims for housing algorithms that do not
use protected class variables (or close proxies) [8]. The rule seeks to implement the Supreme Court’s
decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc. [7], which requires housing discrimination plaintiffs to “show a causal connection between the
Department’s policy and a disparate impact.” That said, from a statistical perspective, the presence
or absence of protected class variables (or close proxies) in the algorithm does not indicate the
presence or absence of a causal connection [31]. It is thus important for the ML research community
to assist policymakers with translating causality from a legal perspective into the technical context.
4
5 Conclusion
If the goal is for ML models to operate effectively within human systems, they must be compatible
with human laws. In order for ML researchers to produce impactful work and for the law to accu-
rately reflect the technical realities of algorithmic bias, these disparate communities must recognize
each other as partners to collaborate with closely and allies to aid in building a shared understand-
ing of algorithmic harms and the appropriate interventions, ensuring that they are compatible with
real-world legal systems.
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